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 As the world’s only superpower, the United States of America finds itself chal-lenged by adversaries who know they cannot confront it directly, toe to toe, 
on traditional battlefields, or on or under the world’s oceans�1 In their attempts to 
follow Sun Tzu’s instruction to “subdue the enemy without fighting,” potential ad-
versaries of the United States continuously assess and probe American strengths 
and weaknesses to identify vulnerabilities for military, political, and industrial 
exploitation� It is not fully appreciated, assessed, or addressed by American policy 
makers and warfighters how vulnerable the U�S� military is to the threat of “law-
fare,” both international and domestic environmental� 
The leading expert on lawfare, Brigadier General Charles J� Dunlap, Jr�, U�S� 
Air Force (Ret�), defines it as the use or abuse of law and legal processes as a 
substitute for traditional military means to achieve military objectives�2 Both in-
ternational environmental-protection political processes and American domestic 
environmental-protection laws and judicial processes offer tempting targets for 
exploitation by weaker adversaries willing to engage in political and legal lines of 
operations against superior U�S� military technologies and capabilities�3 
The authors believe that it is possible for a competitor or potential enemy to 
use systemic American vulnerabilities to wage a campaign of misinformation and 
legal challenges to reduce U�S� military and antisubmarine-warfare readiness� In 
particular, this article focuses on how adversaries could use environmental law-
fare covertly to wage war against the use of active sonar during testing, training, 
Can the U.S. Navy Fall Victim to This Asymmetric Warfare Threat? 
Michael T. Palmer and J. Michael Johnson
The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting. 
SUN TZU
A federal judge has ruled in favor of environmentalists who assert the 
Navy has vastly underestimated the threat to marine mammals posed by 
its use of sonar and explosives during training off Southern California 
and Hawaii.
LOS ANGELES TIMES, 1 APRIL 2015
UNDERSEA LAWFARE 
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and operations� Allowed to proceed unchecked heretofore, this use of undersea 
lawfare may already be providing potential adversaries an inexpensive way of 
reducing the antisubmarine-warfare capabilities of the U�S� Navy and its allies� 
This article is intended to stimulate action by warfighters and policy makers to 
identify, assess, and address this threat� 
The article begins with an overview of asymmetric warfare, an introduction to 
lawfare as a form of warfare, and some historical examples of international law-
fare� It then analyzes the potential military lawfare vulnerabilities to international 
environmental bodies and political processes as well as to American domestic 
environmental-protection laws and judicial processes� The article concludes with 
some lawfare threat-assessment indicators and possible courses of action� 
ASYMMETRIC WARFARE / LAWFARE
Asymmetric warfare threats are nothing new�4 Noting that “at the dawn of the 
21st century, the United States of America faces a broad and complex array of 
chal lenges to our national security,” the White House’s 2010 National Security 
Strategy stated, “In addition to facing enemies on traditional battlefields, the 
United States must now be prepared for asymmetric threats�”5 Reiterating the 
domestic threat posed by this mode of warfare, the Department of Defense’s 2013 
Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities states, 
“Potential nation-state adversaries will continue to refine asymmetric attack 
plans against the homeland as part of their concepts of operation and broader 
military strategies of confrontation with the United States�”6 It now becomes a 
matter of identifying and neutralizing these threats�
By their very nature, asymmetric nontraditional threats come in myriad forms 
and are especially difficult to conceptualize and combat� Knowing this, policy 
makers and warfighters must engage in rigorous and comprehensive strategic, 
operational, and tactical vulnerability self-assessments to identify and mitigate 
future challenges� In the past, these self-assessments have focused almost exclu-
sively on a limited number of more traditional asymmetric threats (e�g�, cyber 
and terrorist)� Unfortunately, as the 9/11 attack and the recent North Korean 
cyber attacks more than amply demonstrated, asymmetric threats are often not 
identified in time to prevent damage; more-effective and more-meaningful as-
sessments must account for creative and novel attacks� Consideration of the entire 
spectrum of potential asymmetric threats requires truly imaginative thinking� 
Such thinking cannot simply ignore previously unidentified threats to U�S� 
military capabilities and the changing nature of warfare� In their 1999 book Unre-
stricted Warfare, Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui of the Chinese People’s 
Liberation Army address some mechanisms a nation such as China can use to 
defeat a technologically superior adversary, such as the United States�7 Noting 
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the narrow American focus on technology, Qiao and Wang argue that the United 
States is particularly vulnerable to attack along nontechnological legal, economic, 
and terrorist lines.8 The U.S. Department of Defense in its 2005 National Defense 
Strategy acknowledged the issue: “Our strength as a nation state will continue to 
be challenged by those who employ a strategy of the weak using international 
forums, judicial processes, and terrorism.”9 Thus, an adversary’s use (or misuse) of 
international political processes, domestic laws, and judicial processes constitutes 
a recognized and potentially feasible asymmetric threat. 
INTERNATIONAL LAWFARE
The term “lawfare” may be of recent vintage, but its practice in international 
forums is not new. Weaker nation-states have long used international legal pro-
cesses, world opinion, and domestic political support to try to level the playing 
field and neutralize an adversary’s technological or other advantages. Qiao and 
Wang describe international law warfare as “seizing the earliest opportunity to 
set up regulations.”10 This initiative allows an adversary to define the “problem,” 
control the agenda, force adverse responses, and achieve desired results. 
Historically, weaker parties have attempted to achieve such leveling by as-
serting that a stronger party’s technology, weapons, or doctrines violate the 
international law of armed conflict. When successful, these efforts achieve an in-
expensive, asymmetric, nonkinetic impact that restricts a stronger nation-state’s 
military capabilities while undercutting its strategic or operational advantage. A 
historical example of the use of an international agreement to obtain and secure 
a strategic advantage is the attempt at the 1856 Congress of Paris to set limits to 
naval warfare by closing the Black Sea to all warships.11 Other instances, involving 
operational or tactical advantages, are Pope Urban II’s ban on the use of the cross-
bow against Christians in 1097; the Saint Petersburg Declaration of 1868, which 
prohibited explosive bullets under forty grams in weight; and the Convention of 
1899, which banned the use of expanding (“dumdum”) ammunition.12 
Modern examples of parties using international bodies, other forums, and the 
Internet to limit U.S. military capabilities include efforts to shut down the deten-
tion facility at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba; to ban the testing of nuclear weapons; 
and to prohibit land mines, cluster munitions, space weapons, blinding lasers, 
drones, etc.13 An excellent illustration of international lawfare is the ongoing at-
tempt to blunt superior U.S. military technological capabilities by arguing that 
laser-guided “smart bomb” munitions render traditional “dumb bomb” kinetic 
munitions impermissibly indiscriminate under the law of armed conflict.14 The 
above cases may be motivated solely by humanitarian concerns, but they make 
clear how malevolent or hostile actors could exercise lawfare for military and 
national strategic advantages.15 
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All of this appears to have been given only limited consideration by historians, 
policy makers, or warfighters, and that usually focused on an adversary’s use or 
misuse of international law, mostly the law of war or of armed conflict� Nothing 
limits the exploitation of international or domestic laws and legal processes to 
achieve strategic, operational, or tactical advantage� The option to exploit Ameri-
can environmental-protection processes and laws is particularly attractive, given 
their particular susceptibility to abuse and manipulation� 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAWFARE 
The environmental subset of lawfare is the use or misuse of environmental-
protection laws and legal processes as a substitute for traditional military means 
to achieve objectives�16 What would such a campaign against the United States, 
specifically against the Navy’s antisubmarine capabilities, look like? To follow the 
Unrestricted Warfare playbook: adversaries, operating through activist environ-
mental organizations—their knowing or unknowing proxies—would manipulate 
influential international forums, conferences, or governing bodies in a multi-
pronged strategy to neutralize particular U�S� military superiorities, whether 
technological, tactical, or strategic�
An adversary’s first need is for a proxy� Failing to co-opt an authentic well-
intentioned environmental group, it must create an entity that appears to be one, 
that closely parallels the structure and operations of such successful nongov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs) as the Natural Resources Defense Council or 
Greenpeace�17 These organizations’ activities would include fund-raising, press 
conferences, press releases, blogs, websites, social media campaigns, lobbying, 
meetings, conferences, and symposia, as well as partnerships with other respect-
ed NGOs and influential organizations, universities, and individuals and spon-
sorship of “research�” To the public, these activities would appear to be legitimate, 
if not noble, aimed solely at the protection of marine mammals or the promotion 
of other oceanic environmental causes� In these ways proxy environmental NGOs 
would achieve significant leverage, building on the infrastructure, strategic com-
munications, and other achievements of the scores of legitimate groups� Ideally, 
from the adversary’s viewpoint, they could perform as self-funded, self-sufficient, 
and perpetual “launch and forget” weapons� 
Next would be the development and execution of an effects-based, multime-
dia, external strategic communications plan� This plan would be centered on a 
comprehensive, well-resourced, and emotion-based public relations campaign 
that attempts to create both an “environmental crisis” and an “international con-
sensus�” That consensus would point to a predetermined solution that only the 
proxy group can provide and that is, not coincidentally, inimical to targeted U�S� 
military capabilities� 
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Recent efforts by (doubtless genuine) environmentalists demonstrate the po-
tential effects of international strategic communications campaigns on military 
readiness� For example, environmentalists have expended significant effort and 
expense in public relations and strategic communications campaigns to “corre-
late” military active-sonar use with worldwide marine-mammal mass strandings� 
These events include, but are not limited to, the Canary Islands (1985, 1988, 1989, 
2002, 2004), Greece (1996), the U�S� Virgin Islands (1998, 1999), the Bahamas 
(2000), Madeira (2000), the northwest coast of the United States (2003), and the 
coast of North Carolina (2005)�18
Let us set aside the emotional message of the environmentalists and look at 
the facts� The Navy has been using active sonar for testing and training for over 
eighty-five years in the waters listed above and in other waters under the same 
conditions� Despite millions of dollars’ worth of dedicated research, NGOs and 
other groups have been unable to present a single persuasive, peer-reviewed, 
empirically based, scientific study that definitively links military sonar use to sig-
nificant long-term adverse physiological impacts on marine mammals� At best, 
opponents of military sonar have “correlated” worldwide antisubmarine training 
and active-sonar employment with the stranding of approximately fifty marine 
mammals during the period 1996–2006, an average of five per year� The loss of 
five marine mammals per year to military sonar use pales in comparison to the 
estimated six hundred thousand marine mammals killed each year in the same 
period by commercial fisheries�19 In the meantime, countries such as Iceland, 
Norway, and Japan continue to hunt whales, Japan alone accounting for nearly 
two thousand whale deaths a year under its controversial “research” and other 
treaty exemptions�20 
Despite these facts, the campaign against Navy training activities and active 
sonar use has been, by any measure, spectacularly successful� Given the relative 
lack of meaningful natural-resource-protection benefit to be gained by either 
eliminating or reducing antisubmarine-warfare training worldwide, the prudent 
response is to ask, Where’s the crisis? Even better questions are, How and why 
did this become a crisis? How are these efforts affecting U�S� military capabilities? 
Granting for argument’s sake the highest motivations for the current anti-active-
sonar strategic communications campaign, it should be clear that an adversary 
could mount a similar campaign to obtain comparable or more damaging results� 
This possibility is relevant for any asymmetric-threat assessment� 
Another avenue of attack using international lawfare is targeting influential 
international forums, conferences, and governing bodies in aggressive and so-
phisticated lobbying and “educational” campaigns� A potential adversary’s initial 
attempt will be to use or modify existing international treaties, conventions, or 
regional agreements to obtain statements, resolutions, or other endorsements for 
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significant reductions in the use of, for example, military sonar testing, training, 
and operations� 
Again, consider the effectiveness of environmental-group efforts� For more 
than a decade coalitions of environmentalists and others have lobbied and in-
fluenced numerous international bodies against the use of military active sonars 
because of the alleged harm caused to marine resources in general and marine 
mammals in particular� Table 1 lists some of the major “wins” by these groups 
during the last decade� They represent diversions of time, effort, and resources on 
TABLE 1
INTERNATIONAL SONAR ACTIONS
Legal Body / Document Purpose Action
1994, United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea 
UNCLOS, with 157 signatories, is 
the seminal document governing 
international maritime activities, in-
cluding environmental protection�a
Generally codifying customary 
international law, UNCLOS, among 
other things, assigns member states 
an affirmative obligation and re-
sponsibility to protect and preserve 
the marine environment as well as 
requires member states to assess and 
communicate the potential impacts 
of their activities on the marine 
environment�b UNCLOS regulates 
“pollution of the marine environ-
ment,” defined, in relevant part, as 
“the introduction by man, directly 
or indirectly, of substances or energy 
into the marine environment�”c
2004, International Convention for 
the Regulation of Whaling 
The ICRW is an international 
agreement signed in 1946 to ensure 
the protection and conservation of 
worldwide whale stocks by establish-
ing a system of international regula-
tion of the members and contracting 
governments’ commercial, scientific, 
and aboriginal whaling practices�d
Its June 2004 International Whaling 
Commission’s Scientific Committee 
Report claimed that “compelling 
evidence” implicates ocean noise as a 
threat to marine mammals�e
2004, European Parliament The EP is the directly elected parlia-
mentary body of the member states 
of the European Union�f Together 
EP and the Council of the European 
Union form the bicameral legislative 
branch of the EU’s institutions�
In October 2004, the EP overwhelm-
ingly adopted a resolution calling for 
a moratorium on military sonars�g
2004, International Union for Con-
servation of Nature
In November 2004, its World 
Conservation Congress passed 
Resolution 3�068 calling for interna-
tional action to address the problem 
of ocean noise, including military 
sonars�h
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Legal Body / Document Purpose Action
2006, Agreement on the Conserva-
tion of Cetaceans in the Black Sea, 
Mediterranean Sea and Contiguous 
Atlantic Area (ACCOBAMS) / 2006, 
Agreement on the Conservation of 
Small Cetaceans of the Baltic, North 
East Atlantic, Irish and North Seas 
(ASCOBANS) 
Aimed at preserving and protect-
ing the numerous small migratory 
cetacean species native to the seas 
bordering Europe, including dol-
phins, whales, and harbor porpoises, 
the ACCOBAMS and ASCOBANS 
are regional cooperative agreements 
“to reduce threats to cetaceans, 
improve knowledge, and conserve 
marine diversity�”i
In December 2006 ASCOBANS 
parties passed Resolution 4, 
“Adverse Effects of Sound, Vessels 
and Other Forms of Disturbance 
on Small Cetaceans,” calling for the 
development of effective mitigation 
measures to “reduce disturbance of, 
and potential physical damage to, 
small cetaceans�”j
“The European Cetacean Society 
resolution adopted during the 23rd 
Conference (2009), requests to ur-
gently adopt and enforce regulations 
for effective mitigation of active so-
nar use� This Resolution particularly 
urges competent authorities to take 
into account the conservation status 
and the potential and known effects 
of sonar on beaked whales�”k
2008, Convention on the Conserva-
tion of Migratory Species of Wild 
Animals 
CMS is an intergovernmental treaty 
concerned with the conservation 
of terrestrial, marine, and avian 
migratory wildlife and habitats on a 
global scale�l
Meeting in Rome in December 2008, 
the CMS Conference of Parties ad-
opted a resolution entitled “Adverse 
Anthropogenic Marine/Ocean Noise 
Impacts on Cetaceans and Other 
Biota” (Resolution 9�19)�m Resolution 
9�19 recognizes anthropogenic ocean 
noise as a form of energy “pollution” 
and reaffirms that “the difficulty of 
proving negative impacts of acoustic 
disturbance on cetaceans neces-
sitates a precautionary approach in 
cases where such impact is likely�”n 
Notes:
  Acronyms used in tables 1 and 2 are expanded in table 3.
 a. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 [hereafter UNCLOS]. An overview and copy of the full text is 
available at United Nations, www.un.org/. See Elena M. McCarthy, “International Regulation of Transboundary Pollutants: The Emerging Challenge 
of Ocean Noise,” Ocean and Coastal Law Journal 6, no. 2 (2001), pp. 275–77.
 b. UNCLOS, arts. 192, 204–206.
 c. Ibid., art. 1(1)(4) [emphasis added].
 d. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling. A copy of the convention is available at International Whaling Commission Key Documents, 
iwc.int/convention. The list of the ICRW members and contracting governments is available at International Whaling Commission, iwc.int/.
 e. International Whaling Commission, Scientific Committee (IWC-SC) Report Annex K: Report of the Standing Working Group on Environmental Con-
cerns (Cambridge, U.K.: May 2004). A copy of the report is available at The Acoustic Ecology Institute, www.acousticecology.org/.
 f. European Parliament, www.europarl.europa.eu/. 
 g. European Parliament, Resolution on the Environmental Effects of High-Intensity Active Naval Sonars, B6-0089/2004, available at awionline.org/. The 
resolution called on the EU and its member states to “adopt a moratorium on the deployment of high-intensity active naval sonars until a global 
assessment of their cumulative environmental impact on marine mammals, fish and other marine life has been completed.”
 h. International Union for Conservation of Nature World Conservation Congress, Resolution 3.068, “Undersea Noise Pollution,” in Resolutions and 
Recommendations: World Conservation Congress, Bangkok, Thailand, 17–25 November 2004 (Gland, Switz.: 2005), available at cmsdata.iucn 
.org/.
 i. Agreement on the Conservation of Cetaceans in the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea and Contiguous Atlantic Area (ACCOBAMS). Text available at 
ACCOBAMS, www.accobams.org/. There are currently twenty-eight contracting-party governments; a complete list as of September 2011 is at ibid. 
ACCOBAMS was established under the auspices of the United Nations Environmental Programme’s 1979 Convention on the Conservation of Migra-
tory Species of Wild Animals; see Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, www.cms.int/en.
 j. 5th Meeting of the Parties to ASCOBANS, the Netherlands, 18–20 September and 12 December 2006, Resolution 4, Adverse Effects of Sound, Vessels 
and Other Forms of Disturbance on Small Cetaceans, available at www.ascobans.org/.
 k. Fifth Meeting of the Parties to ACCOBAMS, Tangier, 5–8 November 2013, Anthropogenic Noise and Marine Mammals: Review of the Effort in Ad-
dressing the Impact of Anthropogenic Underwater Noise in the ACCOBAMS and ASCOBANS Areas, p. 16, available at www.cbd.int/. 
 l. Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals.
 m. Convention on Migratory Species, Ninth Conference of the Parties, Rome, 1–5 December 2008, Adverse Anthropogenic Marine/Ocean Noise Impacts 
of Cetaceans and Other Biota, UNEP/CMS/Resolution 9.19, available at www.cms.int/.
 n. Ibid., p. 2.
INTERNATIONAL SONAR ACTIONS CONTINUED
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the part of the U.S. Navy, to the detriment of readiness and national defense. The 
long-term impacts, if any, have yet to be fully assessed and quantified. But these 
actions succinctly illustrate how strategic communications campaigns can seize 
effective control of processes and achieve desired end states. The proponents of 
the activities listed in table 1 are presumably at least willing to accept degrada-
tion of both antisubmarine-warfare capability and overall readiness. It is not 
difficult to imagine the assimilation of similar processes, to obtain comparably 
adverse impacts, by actors who specifically desire to target military capability or 
technological superiority. 
A logical extension and continuation of international environmental lawfare 
would be new international treaties, conventions, or agreements directly reduc-
ing or banning particular technologies or warfighting capabilities. Suggestive of 
what such efforts would look like, were it in the hands of an actual adversary, is 
Greenpeace International’s proposal for a global network of marine reserves cov-
ering 40 percent of the world’s oceans, including international waters.21 If enact-
ed, the implications for military readiness and operations are painfully obvious. 
It should be noted that a significant constraint on an adversarial international 
lawfare arises from one of the limitations of international law itself: the general 
lack of meaningful enforcement mechanisms. Since all nation-states are sover-
eign, each unilaterally decides whether to commit itself to given international 
conventions, treaties, or agreements. Even when a nation-state does so, compli-
ance remains voluntary and effectively immune from enforcement in case of 
alleged or real violations. 
DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENTAL LAWFARE
This situation changes dramatically, however, when a potential adversary shifts to 
the arena of American domestic environmental law. The United States proclaims 
itself a world leader in environmental and natural-resource protection. The Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency is a cabinet-level entity, and Congress has enacted 
over a hundred environmental laws since 1899 establishing programs to improve 
air and water quality; handle solid, hazardous, and toxic wastes; clean up land-
fills; and protect endangered species, as well as natural and cultural resources. 
In the United States, environmental-protection laws differ from most other 
federal statutes in that Congress has intentionally waived U.S. sovereign im-
munity. The majority of American environmental-protection laws mandate 
federal-agency compliance and apply injunctive, civil, and criminal sanctions 
to the government’s employees, officers, and officials. For the most part, these 
waivers of federal sovereignty do not exempt the Department of Defense. Ac-
cordingly, the Navy, like other federal agencies, is subject to myriad federal and, 
in some cases, state, territorial, and tribal environmental laws and regulations. 
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These include, but are not limited to, the “big four” affecting maritime readiness: 
National Environmental Policy Act requirements for preactivity environmental 
impact statements; Marine Mammal Protection Act requirements for incidental 
take authorizations; Endangered Species Act requirements for consultation prior 
to any activities that “may affect” a threatened or endangered species or habitat; 
and Coastal Zone Management Act requirements for federal agency “consis-
tency” with state coastal-zone management�22 
To take midfrequency active sonar as an example, the Navy is required to as-
sess the potential impacts of its use on the environment and maritime resources� 
To start with, it must conduct requisite preactivity environmental planning, in-
cluding documented impact analyses to determine whether the intended sonar 
use will adversely affect marine resources� If expected impacts exceed certain 
statutory or regulatory thresholds, the Navy is required to consult federal and 
state regulatory and coastal-resource agencies� It may also be required to obtain 
federal authorization� These consultations, authorizations, approvals, and noti-
fications often produce detrimental restrictions of time, place, and operational 
mode, such as prohibition of sonar use at night�
U.S. EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT 
Increasing the attractiveness to potential adversaries of encumbering U�S� Navy 
military readiness with burdensome agency approvals processes (and the possibil-
ity of civil damage awards and court injunctions) is the 1980 Equal Access to Jus-
tice Act (EAJA)�23 The EAJA authorizes U�S� federal courts to award (aside from 
injunctions and civil damages) costs and attorney fees “in any civil action brought 
by or against the United States or any agency or any official of the United States�”24 
These “civil actions” include environmental and resource-protection compliance 
challenges� Originally intended to assist small businesses to defend themselves 
from governmental agency actions, the EAJA also extends to 501(c)(3) nonprofit 
organizations, including environmental NGOs and other private groups� 
Under the EAJA, plaintiffs, if they prevail, are entitled to reimbursement for 
their attorney fees, up to $750 per hour, and other allowed costs incurred in bring-
ing the lawsuit (e�g�, expert witness fees, costs of scientific studies, mailings)� In 
some cases, costs and attorney’s fees are payable even to plaintiffs who ultimately 
lose their legal challenges� Exact costs to the federal government and American 
taxpayers are apparently unknown, untracked, and unreported by most federal 
agencies� One Government Accountability Office study tracked 525 reimburse-
ments during 2001–10 resulting in $44�4 million in legal-fee reimbursements�25 
Some examples to date from recent federal lawsuits by environmental groups and 
others challenging U�S� Navy active sonar include approximately $1�7 million for 
a 2002 lawsuit challenging low-frequency sonar use in the Pacific; approximately 
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$400,000 for the five-day injunction on U�S� midfrequency active sonar during 
the 2006 Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) multinational training exercise; and over 
$500,000 in attorney fees and costs alone related to an injunction in the Navy’s 
Southern California Operating Area� 
The EAJA “fee shifting” mechanism provides both an incentive and a steady 
source of income to law firms willing to litigate environmental compliance chal-
lenges against U�S� military departments and its officials, even on behalf of poten-
tial adversaries engaging in an asymmetric lawfare campaign� From the perspec-
tive of lawfare vulnerabilities, judicial enforcement of federal agency compliance 
provides adversaries an effective, essentially cost-free means to engage in legal 
lines of attack against U�S� military readiness�
U.S. DOMESTIC SONAR LITIGATION
For over a decade the Navy has been challenged in federal court by environmen-
tal NGOs and other groups seeking court orders enjoining active-sonar use, test-
ing, and training� While their specifics vary slightly, these legal challenges have 
commonalities� They all allege violations of American domestic environmental- 
planning and natural-resource-protection laws, and they all seek judicial in-
tervention to reduce or end, temporarily or permanently, Navy midfrequency 
active-sonar testing and training� Finally, the lawsuits target almost exclusively 
the Pacific theater antisubmarine warfare training areas off the coasts of Califor-
nia, Hawaii, and the Pacific Northwest�26 As one example, on 3 July 2006 the U�S� 
District Court for the Central District of California issued an injunction barring 
the Navy from training with midfrequency active sonar during RIMPAC 2006 off 
the Big Island of Hawaii�27
Table 2 summarizes the major domestic legal challenges against the Navy since 
2002� Like table 1, it shows clearly how an adversary could capitalize on Ameri-
can domestic environmental laws and federal judicial processes to eliminate or 
degrade military capabilities� 
LAWFARE THREAT-ASSESSMENT INDICATORS
The authors understand the inherent difficulties of identifying and assessing 
nontraditional asymmetric threats as a whole or of legal lines of operations in 
particular—hence the appeal of lawfare to potential adversaries� The following 
considerations may help separate actual threats from the background “noise” of 
legitimate challenges� 
What Is the Target? 
Is the international effort, strategic communications campaign, or lawsuit 
aiming at an increase in environmental or natural-resource protection or at 
something else? Does it seek rather to limit military-readiness activities, such as 
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TABLE 2
U.S. DOMESTIC SONAR LITIGATION EXAMPLES
Case Court Claim Result
Natural Resources Defense 
Council v. U.S. Navy
U�S� Federal Dist� Court 
(C�D� Cal� 2002)
NEPA, ESA, MMPA, and 
MSA violated by U�S� 
Navy’s LWAD program, 
including active sonar
Dismissed
NRDC v. Evans U�S� Federal Dist� Court 
(N�D� Cal� 2002)
MMPA, ESA, and NEPA 
violated by U�S� Navy’s 
peacetime use of low-
frequency active sonar 
systems (SURTASS-LFA) 
for training, testing, and 
routine operations in the 
world’s oceans
Permanent “tailored” 
injunction granted to 
plaintiffs limiting U�S� 
Navy’s use 
Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush U�S� Federal Dist� Court 
(D� Haw� 2003)
ESA, MMPA, and NEPA 
violated by U�S� Navy 
use of SURTASS-LFA 
for training, testing, and 
routine operations in the 
world’s oceans
Dismissed—whales and 
dolphins were not “per-
sons” under the acts and 
therefore lacked standing 
to bring claims
NRDC v. Winter I U�S� Federal Dist� Court 
(C�D� Cal� 2005) 
NEPA, APA, and ESA 
violated by all U�S� Navy 
uses of midfrequency ac-
tive sonars 
Injunction sought
NRDC v. Winter II U�S� Federal Dist� Court 
(C�D� Cal� 2006) [amend-
ed complaint]
MMPA, NEPA, ESA, 
and CZMA violated by 
U�S� Navy’s use of MFAS 
during its international 
RIMPAC exercises off 
Hawaii
Preliminary injunction 
granted prohibiting U�S� 
Navy use of MFAS for 
training
NRDC v. Winter II U�S� Federal Dist� Court 
(C�D� Cal� 2007) [amend-
ed complaint]
MMPA, NEPA, ESA, 
and CZMA violated by 
U�S� Navy’s use of MFAS 
during exercises in the 
Southern California 
Operating Area February 
2007–February 2009
Preliminary injunction 
granted, later vacated 
for tailored injunction 
measures
NRDC v. Winter II U�S� Supreme Court 
(2008)
U�S� Navy alleged lower 
courts erred in granting 
injunctions
Lower courts reversed
NRDC v. Gutierrez U�S� Federal Dist� Court 
(N�D� Cal� 2008)
MMPA, NEPA, and ESA 
violated by U�S� Navy 
SURTASS-LFA use on the 
world’s oceans
2002 injunction contin-
ued; case settled 
Ocean Mammal Inst. v. 
Gates
U�S� Federal Dist� Court 
(D� Haw� 2008)
NEPA, ESA, CZMA, and 
MSA violated by U�S� Na-
vy’s use of MFAS in twelve 
undersea warfare exercises 
in the Hawaiian Islands 
Operating Area January 
2007–January 2009
Preliminary injunction 
ordered requiring U�S� 
Navy implementation 
of restrictive mitigation 
measures
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development, testing, training, and operation? For example, does the group target 
only U�S� Navy active sonar but not other maritime activities potentially equally 
harmful to marine resources, such as commercial shipping, fishing, natural-
resource exploration, air-gun arrays, or recreational boating?28
Analysts should also consider what other activities groups are targeting� Illus-
trative are two separate lawsuits, filed in 2003 and 2004, in which environmental 
NGOs sued the Department of Commerce’s National Marine Fisheries Service to 
stop it from issuing scientific research permits to determine the impacts of active 
sonar on marine mammals�29 In one case, the court issued a temporary injunction 
against scientific experimentation in the northern Pacific Ocean to test whale-
finding high-frequency sonar on grey whales�30 Again, our reasonably prudent 
policy maker and warfighter should be asking why any group or individual 
purportedly dedicated to environmental and natural-resource protection would 
actively attempt to impede scientific studies to determine whether an activity 
may have an adverse environmental or natural-resource impact� 
Finally, are U�S� military technologies or capabilities exclusively, or almost 
exclusively, the targets? Since similar human activities will likely cause adverse 
impacts anywhere in the world regardless of the political or military affiliation, 
genuine environmental challenges should be politically and militarily neutral 
in strategy and tactics� Disparities here may indicate malicious intent� It casts 
no aspersion on any environmental group or individual—certainly none is 
Case Court Claim Result
Earthjustice et al. v. Nat’l 
Marine Fisheries Service 
(NMFS)a
U�S� Federal Dist� Court 
(N�D� Cal� 2012)
APA, ESA, and MMPA 
violated by U�S� Navy’s 
MFAS use for ASW 
training in its Northwest 
Training Range Complex 
off Washington State
Injunction sought by 
plaintiffs to enjoin U�S� 
Navy MFAS use
Earthjustice et al. v. NMFS, 
U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 
and U.S. Navyb
U�S� Federal Dist� Court 
(D� Haw� 2014)
ESA, NEPA, and MMPA 
violated by U�S� Navy 
MFAS use for ASW  
training in its Hawaii–
Southern California 
Training and Testing 
Study Area
Summary judgment in 
favor of environmental 
NGO plaintiffs granted on 
31 March 2015
Notes:
 a. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, U.S. Dist. Ct. (No. Dist. of Cal.), 25 January 2012, available at earthjustice.org/. Plaintiffs: Earthjustice, 
InterTribal Sinkyone Wilderness Council, Center for Biological Diversity, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., People for Puget Sound, Friends of 
the San Juans, and Friends of the Earth. 
 b. Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, U.S. Dist. Ct. (Dist. of Hawaii), Civil No. 13-00684 SOM RLP, 15 January 2015, available 
at earthjustice.org/. Plaintiffs: Earthjustice, Conservation Council for Hawai’i, Animal Welfare Institute, the Center for Biological Diversity, and Ocean 
Mammal Institute.
Source: Craig, “Beyond Winter v. NRDC.”
U.S. DOMESTIC SONAR LITIGATION EXAMPLES CONTINUED
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intended—to point out in this connection a potentially important discrepancy in 
current practice� At least one major environmental NGO has adopted the strat-
egy of mounting challenges in federal court to compel U�S� Navy environmental 
compliance while simultaneously adopting cooperative “partnerships” to obtain 
equivalent Chinese and Russian environmental compliance�31 The nationality 
of the military forces should be irrelevant, one might reasonably expect, to the 
potential adverse impacts of waterborne sound energy on marine resources� 
Motivation matters�
Where Is the Targeted Activity? 
Lawfare analysts should look for temporal, political, and geographic discrepan-
cies� For example, it seems interesting and relevant that aggressive international 
efforts, strategic communications campaigns, and domestic judicial challenges 
against military sonar use started only within the last decade or so, although the 
U�S� Navy has used sonar for eighty-five years and Congress has enacted envi-
ronmental protection laws for over forty� As noted above, environmental efforts 
appear focused almost exclusively on Pacific Fleet testing and training areas� 
Temporally and spatially they seem aligned with the national security “pivot to 
Asia” and with geopolitical events in the U�S� Pacific Command area of responsi-
bility� They also coincide with China’s drive for naval domination on both sides of 
the Malacca Strait, the South China Sea, and Taiwan Strait and with its (and other 
potential adversaries’) growing acquisition of quiet conventional and nuclear 
submarines� These strategic shifts, in turn, have driven a resurgence of interest 
within the U�S� Navy in antisubmarine warfare� If military sonars do adversely 
affect marine mammals at the individual and species “crisis” levels claimed by 
environmental organizations, one would expect the impacts to be worldwide� Yet 
to date there has been little or no such interest in, and few lawsuits and injunc-
tions have sought to stop, similar sonar use or training in the Atlantic Ocean, Gulf 
of Mexico, Mediterranean, or Persian Gulf� 
It goes without saying that no one factor alone is determinative in identifying 
and assessing potential lawfare threats� Each situation is fact and circumstance 
specific� It is the very nature of nontraditional warfare threats that other factors 
exist outside the scope of this article� What is required is either creativity from 
future analysts or the harsh reality of 20/20 hindsight gained from hard lessons 
learned� 
DEALING WITH AN UNINTENDED VULNERABILITY 
Policy makers and warfighters today should not allow themselves to be com-
placent or, worse, uncreative about such threats as environmental lawfare� They 
must be open to exploring all avenues of attack available to potential adversaries, 
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recognizing the potential for long-term strategic damage inflicted by a malicious 
actor operating either parallel to, or in conjunction with, authentic judicial and 
strategic-communications challenges to military-readiness activities. 
A good rule of thumb would be that the more nontraditional, unusual, and 
unfamiliar the threat, the more serious the required inquiry and assessment. 
Lawfare in general, and international and domestic lawfare in particular, war-
rants the attention of U.S. service colleges and policy think tanks. 
TABLE 3
ACRONYMS
ACCOBAMS Agreement on the Conservation of Cetaceans in the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea and Contigu-ous Atlantic Area 
APA Administrative Procedure Act (5 USC § 701 et seq. [1946])
ASCOBANS Agreement on the Conservation of Small Cetaceans of the Baltic, North East Atlantic, Irish and North Seas
ASW antisubmarine warfare
CMS Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (also Bonn Convention)
CZMA Coastal Zone Management Act (16 USC § 1451 et seq. [1972])
EP European Parliament 
ESA Endangered Species Act (7 USC § 136, 16 USC § 1531 et seq. [1973])
EU European Union
ICRW International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling
kHz kilohertz
LWAD Littoral Warfare Advanced Development (program)
MFAS midfrequency active sonara
MMPA Marine Mammal Protection Act (16 USC § 1361 et seq. [1972])
MSA Marine Sanctuaries Act (16 USC § 1431 et seq. and 33 USC § 1401 et seq. [1988])
NEPA National Environmental Policy Act (42 USC § 4321 et seq. [1969])
NGO nongovernmental organization 
RIMPAC Rim of the Pacific (exercise series)
SURTASS-LFA Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System (SURTASS)–Low-Frequency Active (LFA)b
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
Notes:
 a. U.S. Justice Dept., “Mid- and Low-Frequency Sonar,” The United States Department of Justice, September 2014, www.justice.gov/ (“Mid-frequency 
active sonar (1kHz–10kHz) is the Navy’s primary tactical sonar and its main tool to combat the threat posed by the world-wide proliferation of ultra-
quiet diesel submarines”). 
 b. Ibid. (“SURTASS-LFA is a low frequency passive surveillance system that is deployed on surface ships with acoustic data collection and analysis capabili-
ties. It provides passive detection of quiet nuclear and diesel submarines and real-time reporting of surveillance information to theater commanders”).
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Internationally, the United States is vulnerable to adverse resolutions, pro-
nouncements, interpretations, and other actions by various international bodies, 
organizations, and groups, especially those to which this nation is a party by 
treaty or other similar agreement� It is imperative that analysts understand po-
tential adversaries’ motives and capabilities, recognize vulnerabilities for threat 
exploitation, and exercise due diligence to counter those threats in a timely and 
effective manner� 
Domestically, the congressional intent in waiving U�S� federal relief from 
environmental-compliance injunctions, civil damages, and attorney’s fees and 
costs was to ensure that agencies did their part to help protect the environment 
and preserve natural resources� Notwithstanding, Congress has created an Achil-
les’ heel for military and national security, one susceptible to exploitation by 
potential adversaries willing to engage in lawfare� 
Lawfare attacks constitute the quintessential asymmetric threat, in that they 
exploit simultaneously both strengths and weaknesses of the United States� These 
weaknesses include the nation’s reliance on technology, its culturally myopic 
focus on symmetric kinetic threats, and its hypersensitivity to international 
opinion� The nation’s strengths include its deeply held belief in the rule of law, 
its declared world leadership in environmental stewardship, and its penchant 
for using treaties, laws, and judicial systems to right perceived wrongs� Finally, 
the American taxpayer, through the EAJA and voluntary donations, is clearly 
vulnerable to being made to subsidize lawfare attacks� Everything is in place for 
a sophisticated adversary with the vision, resources, ability, and a “long view” of 
history to exploit these vulnerabilities and thereby impact U�S� military capability 
and readiness� 
As with most asymmetric “peacetime” threats, there is little doctrine and 
less agreement on how to respond effectively�32 However, several commonsense 
options are available� The first is to develop processes designed to look for, rec-
ognize, and assess the full spectrum of potential and actual political or judicial 
threats, such as international and domestic environmental lawfare� It just takes 
creativity and some true out-of-the-box thinking� 
The second is aggressive response to identified lawfare threats� Response starts 
with a comprehensive and coordinated campaign to educate both military and 
civilian leadership, the American public, and allies on the nature of the lawfare 
involved and the strategic and operational implications for security and defense� 
Senior military and executive-branch leadership should begin by elevating this 
problem to a multiagency level� Currently the United States typically generates 
only stovepiped, piecemeal, tactical responses—lawyers fending off lawsuits and 
public affairs teams defensively replying to press inquiries� 
NWC_Winter2016Review.indb   149 12/3/15   11:47 AM
15
Palmer and Johnson: Undersea Lawfare: Can the U.S. Navy Fall Victim to This Asymmetri
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
 1 5 0  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
The international counteroffensive should not be limited to the State Depart-
ment but should proactively track and participate in international conferences, 
governing bodies, symposia, and other relevant forums, in an effort to educate 
audiences and oppose attempts at international regulation of critical activities� 
The domestic counteroffensive should focus on eliminating the pathways vulner-
able to legal lines of attack, especially the exploitation of domestic law� Potential 
options include, but are not limited to, defining and exempting from regulation 
critical military-readiness activities, enforcing registration and tracking as ap-
plicable of environmental organizations and NGOs under the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act, and implementing NGO reforms similar to recent election and 
lobbyist measures� The United States must insist that when it comes to limiting its 
critical military capabilities, litigants must definitively prove the military activi-
ties are actually doing harm—not the other way around� The United States must 
not be continuously obliged to prove its innocence in public forums, online, and 
in the courtroom� 
Additional responses include limiting judicial review of such cases, remov-
ing injunctions as an enforcement option, and legislatively requiring regulatory 
agencies and courts to balance military-readiness impacts with environmental 
protection� Finally, Congress should shift critical environmental compliance of 
military-readiness activity from a matter of statute to presidential executive or-
der� This would maintain the imperative for environmental protection by federal 
agencies but remove judicial enforcement vulnerabilities� An excellent model 
is the executive order directing the services to conduct rigorous environmental 
planning and impact assessments for overseas activities but ensuring these re-
quirements remain free from international or American domestic law interfer-
ence, enforcement, or abuse�33
Potential adversaries are clearly thinking about “subdu[ing] the enemy with-
out fighting” by asymmetric attack against U�S� military capabilities under the 
guise of environmental and natural-resource protection or other types of lawfare� 
American policy makers and warfighters can afford not to respond only if they 
believe no potential adversary will recognize or act on exploitable vulnerabilities� 
If adversaries do seize the opportunity, they may without opposition achieve their 
likely goal—cheaply and effectively eliminating or reducing U�S� Navy readiness� 
In the case of capabilities against quiet diesel-electric and nuclear submarines, 
this reduction or elimination will lead to inability to protect sea lines of commu-
nications, cause a wasteful expenditure of resources in exchange for a minimal 
benefit in natural-resource protection, and substantially reduce U�S� operational 
and strategic options� To exercise the doctrinal creativity required to recognize, 
assess, and respond to such nontraditional asymmetric warfare threats as possible 
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environmental lawfare is not paranoid but rather a prudent exercise in cautionary 
strategic thinking� 
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